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Abstract 
Many explanations in physics rely on idealized models of physical systems. These explanations 
fail to satisfy the conditions of standard accounts of explanation. Recently, some philosophers 
have claimed that idealizations can be used to underwrite explanation nonetheless, but only when 
they are what have variously been called representational, Galilean, controllable or harmless 
idealizations. This paper argues that such a half-measure is untenable and that idealizations not 
of this sort can have explanatory capacities. 
Contact Information 
Andrew Wayne  
Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph 
Guelph, Ontario, Canada N1G 2W1 
Tel: 519-824-4120 x56787 
Fax: 519-837-1315 
 http://www.uoguelph.ca/philosophy/wayne 
 Email: awayne at uoguelph.ca  
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to Bob Batterman, Nic Fillion, Eric Poisson, Wayne Myrvold and audiences at the 
PSA, the 2010 Canadian Philosophical Association meeting and the Perimeter Institute for 
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
  
   
2
1. Introduction 
Knowing why is a singular achievement, distinct from other scientific accomplishments. Science 
aims at describing and representing nature, predicting and controlling it; but science also aims at 
explanation. One standard approach to scientific explanation holds explanations to be deductive 
arguments with true premises. Not all such arguments are explanations, though. Characteristics 
that make some deductive arguments explanatory include that the statements in the explanans—
the premises in the argument—include a relevant scientific law and background conditions 
(Hempel 1965), or that they fall under widely-used patterns of argumentation (Kitcher 1989). 
Another standard approach holds that an explanation gives a true causal or counterfactual story 
relevant to the occurrence of the explanandum—the phenomenon (behaviour, regularity, 
structure) to be explained (Salmon 1984). One thing philosophers do generally agree on, 
however, is that statements in the explanans be true, whether they are about some feature of the 
system, about a relevant natural law, or about a causal or counterfactual relation doing 
explanatory work. It seems a reasonable requirement that the statements adduced to explain 
should describe laws, regularities, causal relations, properties, structures, and so on, that obtain 
in the physical system exhibiting the explanandum.  
The present paper focuses on explanation in physics. It limits discussion to deductivist 
approaches to explanation, on the assumption that these approaches are more likely to be 
relevant across a broad range of fields of physics. In many fields, there is no causal story to be 
told, or at least such a story is not part of standard physics. This and other considerations to 
follow aim to motivate a deductivist approach, but it is beyond the scope of the present paper to 
defend it.  
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Our starting point is an observation about explanation in physics that may come as a surprise: 
virtually all cases of what physicists take to be bona fide scientific explanation fail to satisfy 
even the basic requirements just articulated. Explanation in physics relies essentially on 
idealizations (idealized models) of physical systems, and the explanations themselves contain 
false statements about both the explanatorily relevant features of the physical system and the 
phenomenon to be explained. Some philosophers of physics have recognized this, and have 
responded in various ways that our notion of scientific explanation should be broadened 
somewhat to accommodate these practices. More specifically, they have claimed that 
idealizations can be used to underwrite explanation, but only where the premises in the explanans 
are approximately true of the target system and are fully corrigible, at least in principle. This 
paper argues that such a half-measure yields an account of explanation that is untenable. As we 
shall see, many putative explanations in physics are based on idealizations that fail to meet these 
conditions. These are explanations in which the idealized model doing explanatory work does 
not successfully represent the physical system. The paper suggests that the close link hitherto 
assumed between successful representation and explanation should be loosened.  
2. Explanation via Galilean Idealization 
An idealized model is known not to represent accurately some elements of the target system. 
Abstractions leave elements of the physical system out of the model; approximations simplify 
and misrepresent features of the system in various ways; other sorts of idealization may posit 
structures in the model not present in the system, or worse, even physically impossible. Galileo 
famously developed a range of idealizing techniques aimed at predicting and explaining natural 
phenomena. Galileo’s “idealized construct,” as he called it, of a simple pendulum includes the 
assumptions that the pendulum is not subject to air resistance, that the wire is massless and 
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inelastic, and that there are no other material hindrances or imperfections. He hypothesized that 
an ideal pendulum would continue to oscillate indefinitely with the same amplitude and period 
and that it would obey his pendulum law: “As to the ratio of times of oscillation of bodies 
hanging from strings of different lengths, those times are as the square roots of the string 
lengths” (Galilei 1638/1989, 97). Now, Galileo well knew that this failed to describe and predict 
accurately the behaviour of any of the real pendulums he used in his extended and painstaking 
experimental work. The oscillations of real pendulums get smaller and smaller over time and 
they are not isochronous, as his pendulum law requires. But Galileo, and generations of 
physicists since, have taken the pendulum law to be part of the explanation of the behaviour of 
physical pendulums. And therein lies a problem: none of the standard philosophical accounts of 
explanation canvassed at the outset makes sense of this sort of explanatory practice. 
 There is a response to this problem in the literature, first articulated by Ernan McMullin 
(McMullin 1985). McMullin proposes that a handful of characteristics pick out idealized models 
that can underpin scientific explanation, models he dubs Galilean idealizations. Galilean 
idealization is characterized by the fact that the idealized model approximates the target system 
and, more importantly, that complementary to idealization are reverse techniques for adding back 
real-world details and de-idealizing by eliminating simplifying assumptions. Galilean 
idealizations thus have an intrinsic “self-correcting” feature such that they can (at least in 
principle) be brought in ever closer agreement with empirical observations in a theoretically 
justified, non-ad hoc way. Laurence Sklar and Robert Batterman make a similar distinction 
between what they call controllable and uncontrollable idealizations. “An idealization is 
controllable means that it is possible, via appeal to theory, to compensate in some way for the 
idealization,” whereas uncontrollable idealizations typically involve singular limits and preclude 
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explanation (Batterman 2005, 235; cf. Sklar 2000, 44). Mehmet Elgin and Elliott Sober sketch an 
account of explanation based on this sort of distinction, calling the types of idealizations that can 
underwrite explanation “harmless idealizations” (Elgin and Sober 2002).  
 Two posits seem to underlie the idea that Galilean (controllable, harmless) idealizations have 
explanatory power. First is the notion that all idealizations involved in these sorts of cases are 
approximative, so explanations given, while strictly speaking they apply only to the idealized 
model, are not too far off when applied to the physical system of interest. Second, it is possible 
systematically to refine the idealization to bring it closer and closer to the target system such that 
the statements in the explanation become, in the limit, true of the physical system as well. 
 I suggest that motivating and supporting these assumptions is a deeper intuition about the 
connection between representation and explanation. The reason Galilean idealizations are taken 
to support scientific explanation is that these idealizations achieve a kind of common-sense 
representational success. Philosophers of science are inclined to say that some scientific models 
are about bits of the world, and that models can do a more or less successful job of representing 
those bits of the world. What exactly constitutes a more successful representation is a thorny 
question, with considerations of similarity (Giere 1988) or partial isomorphism (da Costa and 
French 2003) between elements of the model and elements of the physical system playing 
leading roles. Ideas such as these surely reflect what physicists consider successful 
representations of target systems in Galilean cases. In what follows I shall use the term 
“successful representation” to refer, somewhat imprecisely, to these sorts of widely-held ideas. 
Galileo’s simple pendulum models are successful representations, in this sense, because they are 
similar to physical pendulums in what are taken to be obviously relevant ways. Thus, while 
statements in the explanans may not exactly describe the physical system, and while the 
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explanans may not entail or raise the probability of statements about the actual explanandum (the 
behaviour, regularity or structure to be explained), certain features of the idealized model are 
alike enough to the real system to underwrite the explanatory capacities of the idealization. As 
Margaret Morrison puts it, “the explanatory role is a function of the representational features of 
the model” (Morrison 1999, 64). This has been a central assumption of much philosophical work 
on modeling (Morgan and Morrison 1999).  
 Let us call this strategy explanation via Galilean idealization (EvGI). EvGI maintains that 
there is a significant difference between Galilean (controllable, harmless) idealizations and other 
idealizations, and only the former underwrite scientific explanation. It will be helpful to make 
this last claim a bit more precise in the context of the covering law (deductive-nomological) 
approach to explanation. Galilean idealizations feature in covering-law explanations by enabling 
the derivation of a conclusion that approximates, in the sense of differing negligibly from, the 
actual explanandum-statement. We can sum up the characteristics of Galilean idealization just 
sketched in terms of the following conditions on the explanans and explanandum.  
Explanans condition. The premises in the explanans are true of the idealization and 
approximately true of the target system, and they are fully corrigible, at least in principle. 
Explanandum condition. Differences between the conclusion derived from the explanans 
and the actual explanandum-statement are small and are fully corrigible, at least in 
principle. 
Both conditions are based on the intuition, noted above, that statements figuring in successful 
explanations describe elements of an idealization that one is inclined to say “successfully 
represent” or “are about” relevant features of the physical system. The EvGI strategy maintains 
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that explanation as a normative goal of science can only be achieved in the context of Galilean 
idealization, for only Galilean idealization ensures that these conditions are satisfied. 
3. The Challenge from Non-Galilean Idealization 
The trouble is, Galilean idealizations are far more pervasive in philosophical accounts of physics 
than they are in physics itself. Physicists offer explanations of phenomena based on idealizations 
which are not Galilean. These are idealizations that cannot plausibly be said successfully to 
represent a physical system, in the sense in which we are using the term here. They are 
explanations for which the explanans condition fails to obtain. In short, a large part of the 
explanatory practice in physics simply does not fit the EvGI strategy. 
 Some philosophers have brought attention to characteristics of models in contemporary 
physics that are taken to underwrite explanations by physicists yet fail to meet the standards of 
Galilean idealization. In these sorts of models, which I shall call non-Galilean idealizations, 
certain, putatively explanatorily relevant, elements of the model cannot plausibly be regarded as 
being about the physical system, in the sense of successful representation articulated above. 
Statements about these elements, which figure in the explanans, are not even approximately true 
of the physical system. Moreover, we have reason to believe in these cases that this situation 
cannot be ameliorated, even in principle. There are good arguments to the effect that the 
idealization is not corrigible, that is, it is not possible systematically to refine the idealization to 
bring these elements in closer and closer agreement with the target system. In these sorts of cases 
the explanans condition is violated. 
Examples of what physicists take to be explanatory idealizations that fail to fit the Galilean 
approach have been investigated in detail by Robert Batterman (Batterman 2002; Batterman 
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2005a; Batterman 2005b; Batterman 2009). Batterman focuses on physical systems wherein 
base-level (or “fundamental”) theory breaks down, including statistical mechanical models at 
criticality, the breakdown of the wave theory of light in catastrophe optics, and drop formation in 
hydrodynamics. These models include idealizations of components of the system that fail to 
approximate the system itself. In statistical mechanics cases, explanations of critical behaviour, 
for example in phase transitions from solid to liquid or liquid to gas, are based on idealizations in 
which the number of molecules and correlation length go to infinity. These and many other 
features of the idealizations do not approximate the physical system, nor can they be 
incrementally eliminated to enable the idealization to represent more successfully the physical 
system. Finally, physicists take these non-Galilean features to be essential to the explanations 
proffered of observed phase-transition behaviour. 
Other examples of non-Galilean idealizations physicists take to have explanatory capacities 
might include semi-classical and quantum chaos models (Bokulich 2008), computer-generated 
simulations of physical systems, as for example in climate modelling (Parker 2006), and 
nonlinear oscillator systems (Wayne 2010). 
It will be instructive to consider Galileo’s pendulum model in somewhat more detail. Based 
on his work on freely-falling objects, Galileo developed a model of air resistance in which 
resistance increased linearly with the velocity of the object. We now know that for small 
oscillations and with linear damping (as Galileo modeled it), the equation of motion of the 
pendulum is of the form  
(1)                     
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where θ is the angular displacement of the pendulum from vertical, ω0 is the initial frequency 
(2π/period), and α is a parameter that is typically set to optimize fit with the observed behaviour. 
With appropriate initial conditions this equation can be solved exactly to yield expressions both 
for the decrease in the amplitude of oscillation and the increase in its period due to air resistance 
(Nelson and Olsson 1986, 115). In this way, we can compensate for the discrepancies between 
the idealization and the physical system in a theoretically justified and non-ad hoc way. This 
seems a paradigm case of a Galilean idealization. 
 But it is not. This is because for real pendulums of the sort Galileo used, the damping effect 
of air resistance on the pendulum bob is not linear. It can be shown that air resistance produces a 
force that has a quadratic component, based on the Reynolds number for the pendulum bob in air 
at maximum velocity. The equation of motion of a pendulum subject to damping that is quadratic 
in velocity is of the form 
(2)                     
where ε is a small dimensionless parameter related to the strength of the damping. In fact, two 
equations of motion are required, one for each half-period, with the sign of the epsilon term 
reversed in the second equation as the angular velocity changes sign in the second half-period. 
We do not here consider the second equation or matching conditions, as we are interested in the 
correction to the period of oscillation, which is the same in both half-periods. As we shall see, 
the idealization in this case is non-Galilean and it seems to underwrite a full explanation of the 
quadratic damping behaviour.  
 Eq. (2) is of the form  
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(3)  
where θ is the oscillation variable, ε is a small parameter related to the strength of the damping, 
and F is a nonlinear polynomial. This nonlinearity means that the oscillator equation cannot be 
solved exactly, nor, in general, can it be solved using approximation techniques involving regular 
limits, such as regular perturbation methods. Over a long timescale, regular perturbation methods 
break down, yielding results with secular terms (terms that grow without bounds) that diverge 
from the observed behaviour over time. Nonetheless, the behaviour of pendulum over a long 
timescale can be derived to an arbitrary degree of accuracy using one of several singular 
perturbation techniques. 
 The Krylov-Bogoliubov-Mitropolsky (KBM) method, for instance, can be used to determine 
a solution of any differential equation of form (3) to an arbitrary degree of approximation. The 
method involves one substantive assumption about the solution: the amplitude and phase of the 
solution vary slowly, if at all, with respect to the period of oscillation. In other words, the 
solution is periodic and there are no secular terms. Thus, the KBM method assumes a solution of 
the form 
(4)  
where the ui terms are periodic functions of  with period 2π, a is the amplitude of the first 
fundamental harmonic (the dominant oscillation) as a function of time, and  is the frequency of 
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the first fundamental harmonic as a function of time. The time derivative of a and  can be 
written 
(5)  
and 
(6)  . 
The functions ui, Ai and Bi are chosen so that when the expressions for a and  obtained from 
integrating eqs. (5) and (6) are substituted into eq. (4), it becomes a solution of eq. (3). So the 
problem of finding a solution to eq. (3) reduces to the more tractable problem of solving eqs. (5) 
and (6). In practice, eqs. (4), (5) and (6) are limited to a finite number of terms, and in many 
applications, including the pendulum with quadratic damping, consideration of terms up to order 
ε2 is sufficient. Surprisingly, the success of the KBM method does not depend on whether the 
infinite series eqs. (4), (5) and (6) converge, but rather on their asymptotic properties for a fixed 
finite order in the limit ε ? 0. The KBM method provides a general mathematical procedure to 
determine the functions ui, Ai and Bi to any finite order for any  in eq. (3) because the 
finite analogues of the series (4), (5) and (6) are increasingly accurate approximations as ε ? 0 
and as the number of terms in the series increase. For a table-top pendulum of the sort used by 
Galileo, the result is a measurable effect, one that is just slightly less than the effect due to linear 
air resistance and one comparable in magnitude to other known corrections such as the flexibility 
in the wire. 
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 As is typical of singular problems, in the quadratic damping case the idealization is non-
Galilean (uncontrollable, harmful), and no Galilean idealization is available to underwrite the 
explanation. For equation of motion (2) with small ε, a simple harmonic oscillator solution with 
fixed amplitude and period works well over a short timescales. Over long timescales, however, 
qualitatively new behaviours arise that need to be incorporated into the idealization, such as the 
increase in oscillation period and decrease in amplitude. For any non-zero ε, the long-timescale 
behaviour remains qualitatively different from the ε = 0 behaviour. This well-known 
characteristic of singular perturbation problems is sometimes represented schematically as a 
failure of a regular limit relation, 
(7) 0
0
lim =→
≠ eTTεε , 
where T stands for the theory in question (Nickles 1973). To put the point another way, there is 
no smooth deformation from the phase space trajectory of the simple harmonic oscillator to the 
phase space trajectory of the quadratically damped oscillator.  
 The key point is that the quadratic oscillator model cannot be reverse-engineered or corrected 
in a theoretically principled way. Asymptotic methods, such as the KBM method, are not 
physically justified in the way that a regular limiting procedure would be. For one thing, one may 
wonder about the mathematical propriety of throwing away terms in an infinite series that does 
not converge (the same sorts of worries one might have about renormalization techniques). More 
salient is the fact that the method includes ampliative steps, that is, steps in which additional 
substantive information is required beyond the basic equation of motion and initial conditions. 
These assumptions are ad hoc, in the sense that they are based on empirical observations about 
the behaviour of the system, not on any theoretical understanding contained in the equation of 
motion. In the quadratic damping case, we introduced the assumption of a periodic solution with 
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certain properties in order to make it possible for us to derive such a solution. In sum, the 
idealization in the quadratic damping cases is non-Galilean because it is not fully corrigible in a 
theoretically justified way, and the explanans condition is violated. 
 If this is right, we have the remarkable result that one of McMullin’s paradigm cases of 
Galilean idealization, that of Galileo’s own pendulums, ends up not being Galilean at all. Recall 
that Galilean idealization includes the claim that the idealization can be refined, in principle, to 
an arbitrary degree while satisfying the Galilean conditions. This turns out not to be the case with 
Galileo’s pendulum models once anything more complex than linear air resistance is 
incorporated into the model.  
4. Explanation without Successful Representation 
Based on the foregoing considerations, one could easily suppose that something has gone 
horribly wrong in the explanatory practice of contemporary physics. Physicists put forward 
putative explanations that fail to meet even the most basic and reasonable criteria of normative 
philosophical accounts of explanation, including the extensions contained in the EvGI strategy. 
This supposition should be resisted! As we shall see, it is based on an assumption about the 
connection between explanation and successful representation, an assumption that should be 
questioned and ultimately rejected.  
I have already reviewed the broad role non-Galilean idealization plays in contemporary 
physics, and the range of physicists’ explanatory claims it underwrites. Proponents of the EvGI 
strategy will want to resist these as cases of bona fide scientific explanation, and there are two 
obvious ways to do so. One way is to show, on a case by case basis, that each explanation based 
on non-Galilean idealization should be rejected. One effective method to do this would be to 
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demonstrate that there is a more basic or fundamental route to the same explanandum, one that 
does make use of the EvGI strategy, so that the non-Galilean explanation has only derivative 
status. This has been the response of some philosophers to Batterman’s claims about 
explanations of criticality in statistical mechanics (Redhead 2004, Belot 2005, Batterman 2005). 
However, given the fact that in many cases even simple predictions require appeal to non-
Galilean idealizations, it seems unlikely that further work on the details of Batterman’s (and 
other) examples will demonstrate that explanatory appeal to non-Galilean idealizations can be 
eliminated in each and every case. 
 Another way proponents could defend the EvGI strategy would be to declare, wholesale, that 
physicists are simply mistaken in their claims to have achieved explanations of phenomena of 
interest. What would be needed here is a principled argument for the EvGI tenet that explanation 
as a normative goal of science can only be achieved in the context of Galilean idealization. 
Proponents of the EvGI strategy have not put forward such an argument. But they may not have 
felt the need to do so, because the EvGI strategy is founded on an intuition so basic and powerful 
it may not seem in need of articulation and defence. The problem with explanations in non-
Galilean cases is that they are based on statements about a model that fail (and are known to fail) 
successfully to represent the explanatorily relevant features of the physical system. The EvGI 
strategy is motivated by an intuition about a deep connection between explanation and successful 
representation. This connection is broken in the non-Galilean cases, and this might seem enough 
for the wholesale rejection of non-Galilean explanation.  
The connection between successful representation and explanation merits a closer look. 
Successful representation is commonly assumed to go hand-in-hand with successful prediction 
and successful explanation, and indeed that is true in much of science. As we have seen, 
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proponents of the EvGI strategy are motivated by what they take to be a constitutive connection 
between a common-sense view about successful representation on the one hand and scientific 
explanation on the other. This seems misguided. All we really have is a pervasive but contingent 
connection between the two, and one that does not seem to obtain in some fields of physics. 
Granted that in many contexts, both scientific and practical, predictions and explanations are 
better where statements in the prediction or explanans, making up essential parts of the 
prediction or explanation, are about features of the idealized model that approximate or are 
similar to features of the physical system. However, it is widely appreciated, correctly I think, 
that judgments of similarity are made relative to a context and relative to a determinate set of 
practical ends (Teller 2001). If this is right, whether an idealized model counts as a successful 
representation, in the sense we are using the term here, depends on the use to which it is put. By 
contrast, the explanatory relation is understood by proponents of the EvGI strategy, again rightly, 
not to be a pragmatic matter, or at least not entirely; rather, it is determined by the basic 
explanatory goal of science. All I hope to do here is draw attention to the possibility that in some 
contexts the goal of explanation may not be best accomplished by what we have been calling 
successful representation. If the physicists are even partially right, this is indeed the case with 
non-Galilean idealizations of apparently high explanatory value. 
5. Conclusion 
Explanations are put forward in a range of fields of physics in which idealized models doing 
putative explanatory work do not successfully represent. These are explanations that fail to meet 
the requirements of the EvGI strategy, and particularly its explanans condition. Proponents of the 
EvGI strategy have not shown, nor is it likely that they can show, that each such putative 
explanation is underwritten by an explanation meeting the EvGI conditions. This paper has 
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argued that the EvGI assumption—that explanation as a normative goal of science can only be 
achieved in the context of Galilean idealization—should be rejected.  
A reactionary option remains open, that of resisting any role for idealization in scientific 
explanation. But this option is unlikely to succeed; for one thing, the arguments developed above 
against proponents of the EvGI approach tell equally strongly against such a move.  
Rather, the moral of this paper is that the role for explanatory idealizations should be 
expanded. Doing so would require more detailed work on the cases in physics in which these 
putative explanations are developed. It would also require a normative account that makes sense 
of explanation in the context of non-Galilean idealization in physics, and indeed explanation 
without successful representation more generally.  
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